The mass media are closely associated with the concept of 'soft power' in international relations. Joseph Nye states that 'information is power' and that success in the information age depends not only on whose army wins, but on 'whose story wins'. 1 As the idea of soft power has caught on in policy-making circles around the world, so governments have come to believe in the media's potential to affect their nations' success in the international arena. It is thought that the media shape foreign public sentiments, which in turn affect the acquiescence or resistance of foreign elites to particular foreign policy goals. The validity of this assumption is very hard to 5 or the power/impotence of media during elections. 6 Meanwhile, the literature on Russian foreign policy has tended to attach the soft power label to the Russian mass media indiscriminately without scrutinizing their transnational operations in any depth. 7 This article explores Russian influence on news content in Ukraine through a comparative study of 14 leading Russian-language news providers, some of which had Russian shareholders or partners while others did not. Content samples are analyzed to expose how Russia was portrayed by the 14 news providers over a four-month period in 2010. The content findings are then explained by 28 original interviews with journalists, editors and media professionals. The interviews shed light on factors which shaped reporting about Russia in Ukraine during the period under study, including the impact on content of Russian capital or commercial links. The empirical evidence presented here indicates that news providers in Ukraine which have a Russian shareholder or partner do tend to be more restrained in their criticism of Russia than comparable news providers without such Moscow connections. Some of the media studied generated tendentious coverage of Russia which flattered the Russian authorities.
At the same time, however, this article questions whether the conceptual framework of 'soft power' is adequate to capture the complexities of Russian involvement in Ukraine's media environment. The study reveals diversity among the 'Russian' news providers operating in Ukraine: some clearly served Kremlin interests, but others were motivated by commercial considerations so their journalists were balancing demands from Moscow alongside the demands of their audience. Indiscriminate application of the 'soft power' label risks obscuring this diversity and vulnerability to local constraints. A further problem brought out in the concluding discussion is that Russia's most pro-Kremlin news exporters have demonstrated a considerable capacity to provoke, which may be equally significant for Moscow-Kyiv relations as their capacity to 'softly' attract and persuade a mass audience, if not more so.
CONCEPTUALIZING 'SOFT POWER'
In one recent book Nye defines soft power as 'the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.' 8 A state's soft power, according to Nye, comes principally from its culture, political values and foreign policy. These three resources (and others) can be turned into soft power by 'skilful conversion strategies' which may involve public diplomacy and various other tools.
Scholarly reaction to the idea of soft power has been mixed. There is now a sizeable academic literature addressing the soft power of China, the USA, Japan and Venezuela, inter alia (substantive studies of soft power in the post-Soviet region are not numerous, but are beginning to emerge). 9 Yet Nye's concept has been criticized for several major weaknesses. Besides the practical difficulty of drawing a clear line between power that is 'hard' and power that is 'soft' (e.g. material wealth can coerce and coopt simultaneously), there is a problematic conflation of distinct understandings of power through attraction in Nye's work. 10 On the one hand, he implies that attractive power occurs as a natural by-product of a country's culture, values and policies which hold inherent appeal for particular subjects. Edward Lock calls this 'structural' power because the power is not strictly possessed by an agent; rather, it resides in social structures such as shared norms or values. 11 On the other hand, Nye implies that soft power can be 'produced' by a country investing in broadcasting and public diplomacy. He describes Al Jazeera as a 'soft power resource', 12 not because the TV channel holds attraction for others but because it can transmit messages and frame issues. This understanding of soft power is very agent-centric. Desired outcomes are achieved through communication -wielders of soft power persuade subjects to change their values and priorities, rather than exploiting values and priorities which are already shared. Lock calls this 'relational' power, as the power exists within the context of a relationship between actors.
Because he does not differentiate systematically between these two mechanisms of attraction, Nye's exposition of soft power has been described as 'maddeningly inconsistent'. 13 We still lack a coherent theory of soft power to clarify its causal mechanisms and the part played by the media (Nye himself says that soft power is 'an analytical concept, not a theory'). 14 Further problems lie in the formidable challenge of establishing soft power's effectiveness empirically.
On the whole, scholars have limited themselves to describing what countries do under the banner of soft power; they have not assessed the impact of such activity on the outcomes of foreign policy. As things stand, it might be most accurate to define soft power as a label signifying actions undertaken by states in the hope of influencing opinions abroad, in the hope that by doing so their chances of foreign policy success will improve. Despite these conceptual, theoretical and empirical concerns, soft power is a topic which cannot be ignored, not least because of the traction it has gained among governments. The term soft power (myagkaya sila) has been incorporated into Russian foreign policy: the Foreign Policy Concept adopted by President Putin in February 2013 describes it as 'an indispensable component of modern international relations'. 15 Russia favors the agent-centric view of soft power. The Foreign Policy Concept stresses a state-led approach rather than letting Russian culture, values and policies elicit attraction by themselves. Explicit goals in the Concept which fall broadly under the soft power umbrella include promoting use of the Russian language, boosting the international role of Russian NGOs and strengthening the position of the Russian mass media on the global stage. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the focus of particular attention -the 'common cultural and civilizational heritage' of the CIS states is to be 'preserved and augmented', while Ukraine is to be involved in 'extended integration processes', such as Putin's project for a Eurasian Union. 16 This reflects the rise of Russian 'Civilizational' discourse in recent years. 17 'Civilizationalists' emphasize the distinctiveness of Russia's culture and values and its responsibility to protect and unify those with whom it has historical ties.
Russian-speakers in neighboring states are considered 'compatriots' (sootechestvenniki), whose 'educational, linguistic, social, labor, humanitarian, and other rights' Russia must protect. 18 In Ukraine, where attitudes toward Russia vary substantially along a much studied East-West divide, 19 Russia's 'Civilizational' ambitions and 'soft power' policies are perceived by many as a threat to sovereignty and national identity.
This article does not assess the overall effectiveness of Russia's 'soft power strategy' in Ukraine, nor even the effectiveness of its media component. To do so, one would need to establish the impact of Russian public diplomacy efforts and media messages on Ukrainian public opinion, before tracing the impact of public opinion on foreign policy outcomes -both resourceintensive tasks replete with methodological difficulties. The primary aim here is rather to scrutinize the behavior of various 'Russian' news media in Ukraine, i.e. news media with Russian shareholders or partners, and explore whether -on the basis of their content and editorial policies -they deserve to be labelled so widely and indiscriminately as soft power resources for the Kremlin. The findings relate not only to Russian state TV channels available in Ukraine (whose pro-Kremlin loyalties are not disputed) but also to popular newspapers. Some of the latter are subject to complex and conflicting influences (domestic vs. international), for which the soft power framework fails to account. At times, Russian TV channels have generated political scandals in Ukraine which fit uneasily with the soft power idea of eliciting positive attraction. Thus, this article does not set out to test the association between Russian media and soft power so much as to unpack and challenge assumptions and generalizations on which the association rests.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, Russian involvement in the Ukrainian market for news is described and contextualized. Next, the methods and data used in the study are explained, before presentation of the results in separate sections on TV news bulletins and newspapers. Finally, the article reflects briefly on the potential of Russian news exports to provoke as well as attract, highlighting the need for a more nuanced view of the role played by Russian transnational news media in regional political dynamics.
UKRAINE'S MEDIA LANDSCAPE AND RUSSIAN NEWS EXPORTS
For the past two decades the Ukrainian media environment has been pluralistic and far from transparent, reflecting the nature of Ukrainian politics. As things stood in 2013, all the most popular TV channels and mass-circulation publications belonged to rival privately-owned financial groups, ultimately controlled by Ukrainian 'oligarchs'. The big five media holdings 22 Ukraine has also had numerous media organizations with somewhat smaller audiences which pursue an independent or critical line (e.g. newspapers Zerkalo Nedeli / Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, Den, and Kommentarii; the magazine Ukrainskiy Tyzhden; the website Ukrainska Pravda and cable TV channel TVi). 23 When it comes to following the news, Ukraine is a nation of TV viewers. A survey conducted in November 2011 found that 94 per cent of Ukrainians used TV as a source of news every day or most days. This compares to 31 per cent who used radio; 30 per cent who used newspapers; 22 per cent who used the internet and 6 per cent who used magazines. 24 In fall 2013 Ukraine's most-watched news programs were Podrobnosti on Inter (part of Inter Media) and TSN on 1+1 (part of 1+1 Media). Each had a daily rating around 7-8 per cent, which equates to roughly three million viewers. 25 The other news bulletins with over a million daily viewers were Vikna-Novini million, 26 while the three dailies reported per-issue readerships of 1.3 million, 1.1 million and 0.8 million respectively (it should be borne in mind that there is no independent monitoring of Ukrainian newspaper circulations, so these data may be somewhat inflated for marketing reasons). 27 The press has been losing ground to the internet for years, 28 This overview of Russian involvement in Ukraine's media environment is not comprehensive; it is primarily intended to provide background information about the news providers analyzed below. The focus in this article is on high-profile TV news bulletins and newspapers available nationwide in Ukraine, so radio, the internet and non-news entertainment media are not discussed here, nor is Russian media involvement at the sub-national level.
INVESTIGATING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON NEWS: METHODS AND DATA
In order to assess Russian influence on news content in Ukraine, 14 news providers were studied and compared:
• three nightly news bulletins: Podrobnosti on Inter; Sobytiya on TRK Ukraina; Vremya on Russia's Pervyy Kanal;
• three daily tabloids: Segodnya; Fakty i Kommentarii; Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine;
• three daily broadsheets: Den; Kommersant-Ukraina; Izvestiya v Ukraine;
• five weekly newspapers: mass circulation Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine; broadsheets Zerkalo Nedeli and 2000; Berliner-format Stolichnyye Novosti and Kommentarii During the period under study all these news providers were available nationwide in Ukraine; published or broadcast in Russian; 35 and were well-known (the newspapers reported weekly print-runs over 50,000 and the TV bulletins came from channels that fell within the national top 10 at the start of the study). Six of the 14 news providers had a shareholder or partner in (2000) and Brady and Collier (2010). 37 Causal inference is based on a combination of nominal comparison (analyzing content from news providers that are broadly similar, but differ on the key independent variable of having a Russian shareholder or partner) and within-case analysis (interviewing editors and journalists from each news provider who explain the decision-making behind their news coverage of Russia). 38 The content analysis uses a five-week sample of news from 2010. 39 Simple quantitative content analysis was used to explore variation in the scale of coverage which each news provider devoted to Russia: stories containing three or more Russia-related keywords were coded as 'featuring Russia', then for each news provider the proportion of total stories 'featuring Russia' was calculated. Qualitative content analysis was then used to identify variation in the tone of news 'featuring Russia'. Tone of coverage was assessed through comparison of the news providers' story selection and their reporting of the biggest Russia-related event of the sample period -a visit to Ukraine by Patriarch Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus. In this article the content analysis findings are summarized only briefly due to space limitations.
The interviews with editors and journalists were conducted by the author in Moscow (12) and Kyiv (16) during 2011. The choice of interviewees was guided first and foremost by the aim of speaking to at least one representative from each newspaper and TV news bulletin. Editors-inchief or editors/journalists responsible for international and political news reporting were preferred. 40 In the case of news providers with Russian partners and shareholders, representatives from Moscow-based head offices were also approached. In general, there was a high level of willingness to participate in the research. The only news provider for which no interview could be obtained was Vremya.
NEWS COVERAGE OF RUSSIA IN RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE TV BULLETINS
The scale of coverage devoted to Russia by Vremya, Podrobnosti and Sobytia was found to vary in line with the hypothesis. On average, 85 per cent of Vremya stories (on Russian state-owned Pervyy Kanal) were coded as 'featuring Russia', against 11 per cent of Podrobnosti stories (on Inter, which has a minority Russian shareholder) and just 5 per cent of Sobytiya stories (on Ukraina, which has no Russian shareholder).
The tone of Vremya's coverage of Russia was also in line with expectations. Vremya bulletins were dominated by uncritical reporting of the daily activity of (then) President Dmitriy Medvedev and (then) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In contrast, Sobytiya and Podrobnosti showed only a handful of reports in which Medvedev and Putin figured; they did not broadcast any reports in which the Russian leaders dominated proceedings.
The stories selected by Podrobnosti and Sobytiya presented Russia in a mixed light. It is notable that both these bulletins, unlike Vremya, ran news about a Strategy 31 demonstration in Moscow staged by the anti-Kremlin opposition. Podrobnosti reported from the scene of the protest and interviewed demonstrators, thus highlighting problems with human rights in Russia. Sobytiya showed footage of a 'sympathy' protest held outside the Russian embassy in Kyiv.
On the other hand, Podrobnosti regularly broadcast reports which looked back nostalgically to the Soviet era and beyond. For example, it ran lengthy features to mark the anniversaries of the Tu-104 passenger jet's first flight ('the pride of the Soviet Union'), the first joint US-Soviet space mission and the death of Soviet bard Vladimir Vysotskiy. One might argue that such reports are favorable from Russia's point of view because they emphasize the positive side of its historical relationship with Ukraine. There were no such historical or nostalgic stories on Sobytia. Sobytia was more inclined to run quirky or slightly absurd stories from Russia, such as news about a Canadian model on Chechen TV and an anti-ageing pill invented in Russia.
Podrobnosti paid considerably more attention to Russian-Ukrainian relations than either Sobytiya or Vremya. It was the only bulletin to report any news about bilateral economic ties during the sample period and its reports stressed the importance of the Russian market to Ukrainian businesses. Yet Russia was not always portrayed as a benign economic partner. A Russian ban on Ukrainian dairy produce was described by Podrobnosti's correspondent as a 'milk war' and the 'political character' of Russia's actions was made quite clear. To explore the reasons for these findings, interviews were conducted with editorial staff from Podrobnosti and Sobytiya (interview requests sent to Vremya went unanswered).
The difference in scale of reporting about Russia on Podrobnosti and Sobytiya appeared to stem, first and foremost, from the level of resources which each program had at its disposal, rather than Podrobnosti's Russian minority shareholder. At Ukraina's news studio in Kyiv, a senior editorial figure complained: Anything that doesn't fall into those categories isn't news. Because it's a minus, it misses the cash till. It's propaganda.'
The same interviewee suggested that some content differences between Podrobnosti and Thus, the interviews, together with certain patterns which emerged from the content analysis (i.e. Podrobnosti's willingness to report anti-Kremlin protests), indicate that the 'pro-Russian' slant of which Inter had occasionally been accused was more likely due to domestic Ukrainian political forces than direct Russian shareholder influence at the channel.
NEWS COVERAGE OF RUSSIA IN UKRAINE'S RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE PRESS
Contrary to the hypothesis, news 'featuring Russia' in Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine was found to be no more extensive than coverage in Fakty and Segodnya. In fact, the mean proportion of stories per issue coded as 'featuring Russia' was a little lower for Komsomolskaya The interviewees were asked to explain their lack of editorializing on Russia-related matters. At both Segodnya and Fakty, editorial staff pointed out that an editorially dispassionate position was necessary to retain a mass audience in a politically divided country like Ukraine. At Fakty, a columnist said:
'We consider ourselves a mass [circulation] newspaper. Therefore, we understand that we are read by people with different political and religious views. Why should we impose our opinion on them? We don't have that right!' Similarly, at Segodnya an editor said:
'Our reader… believes we should not complete the thought at the end of the article.
We should give him the opportunity to draw a conclusion himself on the basis of the facts which we lay out in the article... I consider it a great skill: to be able to lay out all the facts so that the conclusion is clear, but you haven't prescribed it; the reader himself draws a conclusion and is proud to be so clever.' Yes, the event happens, but we don't stress it... If we were not the main publication in Moscow we could allow ourselves more.'
The interviewee said that AiF v Ukraine tried not to 'irritate' its readers or trigger reproaches for being 'pro-Russian'. These prerogatives were borne in mind when republishing material from the Russian federal edition. The interviewee herself did not particularly identify with the position she attributes to her readers. At one point she observed: 'Journalists look at their work with sarcasm. It's just work.'
A situation of mutually reinforcing influences, albeit with a very different content outcome, was found to exist at the analytical weeklies Zerkalo Nedeli, Kommentarii and Stolichnyye Novosti.
Journalists from these papers all stressed that they were trying to help decision-makers make good decisions. When they wrote about Russia as a threat, they did so because they perceived it to be so themselves, because their editors agreed with them, and because they believed reports discussing the Russian threat were in the interest of their readers. Thus, one journalist from Zerkalo Nedeli explained:
'There are things which need to be spoken about, for example, issues of security... The Kommentarii interviewee indicated that the owner's influence was fairly light and tended to concern reporting of certain domestic topics more than international affairs. The Stolichnyye Novosti journalist stated that he, too, had experienced only localized owner pressure. He observed that the paper's proprietor (Ihor Kolomoyskyy) had other more significant media to worry about, such as the TV channel 1+1.
As for the daily broadsheets, the content analysis results conformed partially to the hypothesis. a couple of nationalist slogans, which were clearly labelled by the reporter as 'insulting' and belonging to a 'miserly' small group of extremists. Den, for its part, described Kirill as the 'main church hierarch of the empire' and its reporter complained: 'The attack on democratic and independent Ukraine is clearly not weakening.'
When asked why Kommersant-Ukraina did not take an editorial stand of its own, one journalist interviewed described the policy as a marketing strategy:
'There is a rule: analysis is not encouraged at our paper. There is a fear that it won't be objective. In other words, we are supposed to lay out the facts... When Kommersant moved over here, there was too much subjective opinion everywhere.
Kommersant decided that we should differ in some way, there had to be a unique selling point [fishka] . [Our unique selling point is that] we don't write opinion, we write news.'
In fact, this rule that journalists should not explicitly express their own views in print was one of 'There were people in the leadership of the Ukrainian editorial team, in whom we suddenly noticed a certain disdain for the interests of Russia. We did everything so that these people first found out about this, put things right, and if they didn't put things right, they left. This is natural, at the end of the day.. We want to be a European country not only geographically... We do indeed adhere to a pro-Western course, but exclusively to Ukraine's advantage.'
Quite why Den took this forthright approach is unclear; the interviewee said the owner's political views did not make themselves felt at the paper. However, he did note that 'a lot depends on the editor-in-chief'.
DISCUSSION: RUSSIAN NEWS EXPORTS AND 'SOFT POWER'
The research presented above shows that Russian capital and franchisors affected the view of Russia in news consumed by millions of Ukrainians during the period under study, but it also shows that their impact on content varied from one news provider to another. Via Vremya and 44 Another on Pervyy Kanal, titled Oranzhevyye deti tretyego reykha (Orange children of the Third Reich) suggested in February 2010 that the Orange revolution had been staged by second-generation Nazis with assistance from the USA. 45 In 2008 Vremya seized on a report (which originated in the Ukrainian press) about the sale of Hitler dolls in Kyiv, embellishing the story with untrue claims that the doll had become a 'hit' among customers. 46 More recently, the reluctance of President Yanukovych to sign Ukraine up as a full Customs Union member prompted a Russian media offensive against him and his policies. 47 Such Russian 'information attacks' sparked outrage in Kyiv, even though relatively few Ukrainians actually saw the offending content when it was first broadcast. As explained above, Russian TV channels have not had a particularly large audience share in Ukraine in recent years. Yet 'information attacks' by Russia have become news stories in their own right as they have been reported by domestic news providers, posted on YouTube and vocally criticized by politicians, journalists and other public figures.
In fact, Russian news does not even need to be deliberately exported by Russian broadcasters in order to resonate across the border. In March 2013 a local TV station in Russia's Orenburg ran a report about Taras Shevchenko, in which the revered Ukrainian poet was described as a Russophobe and linked to Nazi propaganda. The report was only broadcast in the Orenburg region. Yet it was spotted by Ukrainians living in Russia and subsequently received widespread coverage in the Ukrainian media. 48 It remains an open question whether benefits accrued by the Kremlin from Russian media 'attracting' foreign audiences outweigh the problems caused by Russian media's power to provoke. This is an issue which future research should investigate. In the meantime, the soft power framework should be applied with caution. Indiscriminate generalizations about the 'Russian' media in Ukraine and assumptions that they facilitate Russian foreign policy success are problematic. Rather than soft power, we might use the metaphor of a Soviet-era communal apartment with very thin walls. When Russia talks about its neighbors it tends to be overheard and the neighbors inevitably react. Yet the thin walls are not necessarily an advantage for Russia. To date there is little firm evidence to suggest that Russia's audibility has made its life in the apartment easier -and some episodes indicate that quite the reverse is true.
POSTSCRIPT
This article was completed in October 2013, before the mass protests of 'EuroMaidan', the ousting of President Yanukovych and Russia's annexation of Crimea. The crisis has put the Russian presence in Ukraine's news media landscape into a state of flux: cable transmissions of Russia's main federal broadcasters have been banned by the new Ukrainian government in the interests of 'information security'; 49 Kommersant-Ukraina has ceased publication. Meanwhile, the issue of Russian TV 'propaganda' has hit center-stage. 50 The recent turbulent period arguably underlines the inadequacy of the 'soft power' framework to capture the nature of Russia's transnational media activity and its significance for relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Softly 'eliciting attraction' has been a far lower priority in the Kremlin's information strategy than discrediting the new Ukrainian authorities.
During the crisis, some journalists have written about Russian channels being 'widely watched' in Ukraine and playing a 'crucial' role. 51 Such statements need to be treated cautiously. The Russian propaganda campaign has undoubtedly made political waves, but this may be due to its highly aggressive nature and apparent effectiveness in Russia more than a high proportion of Ukrainians tuning in and taking its claims at face value. As this article has pointed out, the best available data suggest that Russian TV news has been less widely watched in Ukraine in recent years than widely available. Most Ukrainians prefer to get their information about current affairs from domestic channels -which have been reporting the Russian propaganda campaign critically, as a news story in its own right, and exposing elements of disinformation. 52 Across Ukraine, the persuasive power of Russian TV news may have been restricted by other, more popular sources contradicting its messages. The 'power' of Russian TV news during recent
Ukrainian events would in that case be polarizing more than persuasive, stemming from its capacity to deepen divisions between a smaller section of the population who are convinced and a larger section who are offended. Further research into the matter is undoubtedly needed before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
